International Organizations                                        Louiza Patsis                                                  

GOV 153                                                                    April 6, 2006

The Blue Helmets

Objective:  The objective of this paper is to review the successes and failures of a variety of conflicts in which the Blue Helmets have been involved throughout the years, and to show the primary obstacle to effectiveness of some of these conflicts.

            The Blue Helmets are the soldiers of the United Nations (UN). They are composed of troops of member states and conduct peacekeeping (PK), peace enforcement (PE) and humanitarian projects throughout the world. The goal of the United Nations is to promote peace and security based on the equality and sovereignty of the world’s nations. (See Appendix I)  There have been many situations where the UN has had to intervene to uphold peace in conditions of civil war, land disputes and ethnic uprising. He Security Council (SC) is careful to use troops from neutral nations, that is, nations that do not have current disputes with the nation(s) where the violence is taking place.

            Chapter 6, Article 33 (Bennett & Oliver 480) of the UN Charter states: “The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by n negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, restore to regional agencies for arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.” Many Blue Helmet interventions have been preceded by agreements or treaties. Others have involved the Security Council  sending in troops without such agreements.

            Chapter VII Article 42 (Bennett & Oliver 482) states that, if the Security Council  sees that negation does not work it can take action “by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such actions may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

            Legally, the Security Council asks whether a proposed UN activity is consistent with the principles and purposes of the UN and is nowhere precluded. This has been endorsed in the International Court of Justice. (Harrison and Nishihara, 20)

Throughout the over 60 Blue Helmet PK missions, certain factors have been problems. These include not enough troops or money for the missions; inadequate planning and management; consent of belligerents; problems in command and control; inadequate and non-uniform troop training; lack of common doctrine, training and equipment; international dissent of mission objectives; hostile environments ranging from civil war to mountainous terrain; leaders changing their minds about welcoming the Blue Helmets; the UN not appearing impartial; ad hoc improvisational deployment; and overcommitment. About the latter factor, Hillen writes that UN missions after the Cold War often were (xxiv): “…theoretically desirable rather than what is politically and practically feasible”. Another impedance to securing peace is that Security Council  resolutions do not bear legal authority with the world’s nations. Often member states or nations involved in conflict do not agree with the resolutions or break the resolutions. The UN must get consensus in economic sanctions or Blue Helmet operations to try to enforce its resolutions.* Often troops took part in UN missions just to get meager allowances – for troops and the nation.

The success of failure WP of a Blue Helmets operation can be hard to judge. For instance, the result of an operation can be that elections that peace was present for years and then conflict or war broke out, as in the First United Nations Emergency Force in the Suez Canal (UNEF I), Sinai Peninsula and Gaza. Or an election can take place as in UNOSOM IICHECK, and then civil war can continue, as in the United Nations Operation in Somali II (UNOSOM II). Often conflict is stopped but the underlying sources of conflict are not addressed. Hence, there is continuing conflict in areas such as the Middle East.

Some observation or PK operations, such as United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and United Nations Military Observer Group (UNMOGIP), result in stalemate. (Hillen 56)

            Hill and Malik maintained that UN Blue Helmet intervention occurred in five stages: Birth 1947 – 1956; Assertive Period 1956 – 1974; Quiescence 1974- 1987; Expansion 1988 – 1993; and retention 1994 – 1995. Intervention in the Suez Canal crisis was the first Blue Helmet deployment. The Security Council, which needed a unanimous decision to send in Blue Helmets, was a place of many disagreements and vetoes during the Cold War. After the Cold War, decisions were often unanimous and many soldiers were deployed. Missions were often in nations where there was a civil war, in failed states where there was no government or in nations where there was no peace to keep. The UN overcommitted in the early 1990s and faced a crisis. After the second Somalia mission, there was a period of retention where the UN thought more carefully about where to put its troops and money.

            Hillen groups UN Blue Helmets missions into three general categories: 1. observation missions; 2. traditional peacekeeping; 3. second-generation peacekeeping and 4. peace enforcement. (Hillen 17 – 18) Some missions, such as those in the Congo, Namibia or Somalia, can be put in more than one category because of vague or changing military objectives or new Security Council  resolutions passed during the missions.

            Before taking action, the UN would consider: 1. the cost of the operation; 2. the availability of troops; if it is possible to use negotiation or economic sanctions to achieve the same result; 4.location/ 5. geographic terrain; 6. the severity of the event; and 7. the threat to human rights and world peace. (Harrison and Nishihara, 148)

The UN definition of PK is (Hill & Malik, 26): “…operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on consent and cooperation. While they involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them with ‘enforcement action’ of the United Nations under Article 42.”

William Durch of the Henry L. Stimson Center PK in this way: “…uncovering the facts of a conflict; monitoring the border or buffer zones after armistice agreements have been signed;…supervision of the disarming and demobilization of local forces; maintenance of security conditions essential to the conduct of elections; and even the temporary, transitional administration of countries.”

According to Bennett and Oliver, there are six ways to settle international disputes: 1. no action taken by the disputing parties, allowing the dispute to remain unsettled over a period of time; 2.settlement through the parties’ own initiative, using negotiation or other peaceful means of their choice; 3. intervention by an international agency to facilitate peaceful settlement; 4. collective action by an international agency to restore order after international peace has been breached or threatened; 5. coercive self-help, including recourse to war between the parties; and 6. intervention by other states to promote or secure their own interests.

They believe that the idea pf peacekeeping took the place of collective security. Collective security is an idea dating back to ancient Greece and was central to the League of Nations. It rests on the assumption that all nation as share a primary interest in maintaining peace, and threats to peace in any member nation are regarded as a concern for all members of the international system. NATO practices collective defense, which is an attack against an enemy that attacked a member (Bennett & Oliver, 147). This is distinguished from collective security, which involves restoring peace. Conditions needed for collective security include consensus, commitment to peace and collective response (Bennett & Oliver 147). However, it is an ideal for the UN, which has 192 member nations. Nations are often on opposite sides of a conflict. This especially occurred before the end of the Cold War. In addition, some nations do not have the ability or desire at certain points to commit troops. In addition, it may be hard to define aggression (Chapter VI), and a reason for intervention.

Peacekeeping’s purpose is to act as a buffer, keep order or maintain a cease-fire. Weapons are usually used only in self-defense. Neutrality and impartiality is maintained.   Harrison and Nishihara wrote about the importance of polls, or national consensus, in sending troops to UN missions. One United States (US) poll in 1994 (75), 89 percent of people said that it was important to cooperate with other countries by sending troops to UN missions. In the same year, 62 percent of people polled said that it is extremely important for the UN to do a better job at nation-building. Presidents and world leaders often will look to polls before committing troops, especially before an election.

In recent years, peacemaking has also been implemented. Peacemaking involves bringing hostile parties to peace, as by peaceful means such as negotiations and treaty signing.

Some Points of Evaluation of UN Missions

            Command and control refers to the processes and methods by which an organization plans, directs, coordinates and controls its military forces. (Hillen, 43) It can be considered in two parts: the chain of command and control procedures. Command needs to “establish the legitimacy, authority, responsibility and accountability.” Orders need to be “clearly defined, easily understood”. (Hillen, 43)

            There was often more than one chief military Officer (CMO). The Secretary general was ultimately in charge of operations. But getting information to him for the ground often took much time and many steps. Since February 1992, the under-secretary general wash the chief  Secretary-General  adviser and often ultimately in charge of ground operations. But his duties were not specifically described.

            Management was often did not work in Blue Helmets missions. Hillen (57) wrote: …missions were thrown together for disparate resources and deployed to the field with no rehearsed structure, an inchoate chain of command, and a very restrictive modus operandi. UN observation missions did not have an ironclad political legitimacy, a coherent military strategy, or eve effective military operations.”

Observation Missions

Observation missions are the ones that present the least challenge and so are the most common. (Hillen 18) The military effort is usually low and the environment is usually benign.

According to Hillen (38), these tenets needed to be present for observation missions: 1. consent of the belligerents; 2. equitable member composition of force; force from neutral states; and 4. the Blue Helmets could not result to use of arms. The Secretary General usually formed forces by the recommendation of his representative in the area.

Generally, observation missions, were small, inexpensive, did not incite controversy and did not fail. (Hillen 33) Their chief military tasks were (Hillen, 50): 1. border or demilitarized zone monitoring; 2. cease-fire, truce or general armistice agreement monitoring; and 3. the supervision of the withdrawal of forces.

As in PKI, a chief determinant of how the mission was structured, directed and employed was the strength of the peace agreement and the consent of the belligerents. (Hillen 37) when the consent and environment were cooperative, the mission succeeded as in United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I) and United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP). When these two factors were not present, the mission failed, as in United Nations Yemen Observation Mission) UNYOM and United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II).

The first UN military operations were (United States Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB, 1947– 1952), United States Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO,1948 – present),and UNMOGIP (1949 – present). UNSCOB marks the first time that the UN sent observers. (Hillen 28)

UNTSO

UNTSO was formed to observe the ceasefire between Israel and Egypt, and to investigate and defuse local disputes. Arab nations infiltrated Israel after it proclaimed independence. Israel won the war and forced the Arabs into a series of Armistice Agreements in 1949, between Israel and Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon.

UNTSO, being an observer mission, did not prevent Israeli-Arab wars of 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982. Whether it succeeded or not is a point of debate. It did provide a point of contact between nations that did not have diplomatic relations, and often prevented disputes from resulting in even more wars. The futility of many observation missions is evidenced by Egypt telling observers to leave during the impending Suez Canal crisis. UNTSO did serve to set up some observation mission protocols for these emissions: the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC);the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOFIL); the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM); the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I); the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force; and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Observers from UNTSO were deployed in the United Nations  Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP); the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR); the United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEMI); the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONYUCA); the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM); and the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ).

Even this mission, which did not involve military actions, cost the UN $463,667, 258 by 1995. (The Blue Helmets, 32)

UNSCOB

The UNSCOB marked the first time that the UN sent in observers. (Hill and Malik, 28) After World War II, the Greek resistance National Liberation Front (EAM) and its military wing National People’ Liberation (ELAS), was composed of communist and non-communist members. A civil war in Greece began. Since these groups favored communism, Russia vetoed the other Security Council nations to send in a force. UN observers still were sent via the General Assembly. They went in to see if neighboring nations Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia gave arms to ELAS. Albania and Yugoslavia never gave consent and the observers were not instructed to use arms. The civil war was therefore not prevented. But the mission gave invaluable information to the UN by showing how difficult it can be to influence nations.

UNMOGIP

UNMOGIP was the third and final UN mission during the first of the mission periods designated by Hill and Malik (31). The mission followed an agreement between India and Pakistan to cease fighting, which they had been doing over Kashmir. A Hindu leader in Kashmir did not take into account the Moslem majority in creating policy. The accession of Kashmir to India resulted in war in 1947. The mission mandate was similar to the one for UNTSO: to oversee ceasefire between the two ex-belligerents, to prevent minor incidents from escalating to major conflicts and to report on each sides’ compliance with arms limitation. This mission demonstrates how nations ultimately are responsible for their future. Without a lasting political settlement, the solution for Kashmir has still not been found.    

The UN first facilitated negotiations by setting up the UN Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP). It managed to arrange a ceasefire starting on January 1, 1949. (Hill and Malik 32) Kashmir was divided between the two countries. Then UNMOGIP went to India. It had two phases. The first one was between 1949 and 1971 and the second one was 1972 onwards. During the first phase, the Blue Helmets were impartial and gained the respect of both sides, which is very important, as is made evident in missions such as the one in Yugoslavia. The Blue Helmets monitored the ceasefire. India and Pakistan agreed that there would not be any (The Blue Helmets, 135): 1. crossing the cease-fire line; 2. firing and use of explosive within five miles of the ceasefire line; 3. new wiring for mines; 4. reinforcing of positions with troops or arms; 5. forward movement of troops or arms into Kashmir; and 6. flying of aircraft over the other nations’ territory. The Blue Helmets, not authorized to use force, could not do much to prevent these activities, especially when there were only 45 observers for about 500 miles in 1965, for instance. (The Blue Helmets, 137)

However, in the second phase, civil war broke out in Pakistan and India intervened. Bangladesh was founded. India claimed that the Kashmir issue should be bilateral, and not international. India has ceased to cooperate. The UN has maintained the mission, primarily in the hope that the presence of amoral authority will avert future war. (Hill and Malik, 32) Usually noncompliance leads to disaster.

 Perhaps the growing economy of India and its growing dependence on foreign UN-member nations for trade have also averted a huge war. This is an example of the difficulty of isolated UN influence from other influences.

UNIFICYP

UNIFICYP is still in existence today. It originated in 1964 and took place in two periods, between 1964 and 1974 an between 1974 until today. Cyprus became independent in 1960. Eighty percent of the population was Greek and 20 percent of the population was Turkish. Many Greek Cypriots wanted Enosis, or union with Greece. The British had given the Turkish Cypriots more power in t3eh legislature that was fair according to the proportion of their population. In addition, the Vice President would also have to be Turkish. Turks were given 40 percent of the army, and 30 percent of the legislature, civil service and police. President Archbishop Makarios wanted Greeks to have more power in the legislature. Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974. The role of the UNFICYP has been to create and to maintain a buffer zone between the Greeks and the Turks. The ceasefire line extended 180 miles across the country. The Blue Helmets also undertook humanitarian duties.

A UN press release of June 6, 2005 writes that UNFICYP is still stable today, although there are some incidents. This shows that the observer mission may maintain calm for the most part, but it does not get down to the underlying source of frustration and mistrust between the Greek and Turkish communities. The need for the mission still exists. Perhaps if its job were done altogether, there would be no need for it now. Recently, however, the press release reports that air violations have decreased, and progress has been made. For instance, Greeks in the south opened Turkish secondary Security Council Security Council hools and police presence has increased throughout the island.

Whether or not this mission, as others, was successful is a point of controversy. Hostilities and violence like those of 1974 have not occurred. At the same time, the division of the island is not resolved.

UNDOF
            The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force in the Syrian Golan Heights (UNDOF) is another observer mission. It started in June 1974 and still exists today. The objective was to supervise the implementation of the disengagement between the Israeli and Syrian forces in Golan Heights. (Hill and Malik, 48) The Blue Helmets monitored a buffer zone and investigated violations. The force was impartial and contributed to calming the situation. Conditions were created for peace process to develop. This is an example of a successful mission. Consent was there fully. The  Secretary-General  representative Aldo Ajello said that one reason for the success was that the Blue Helmets took into account religious and cultural traditions of the locals.

UNIIMOG

The United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer group (UNIIMOG) mission took place between 1988 and 1991. The objectives were to monitor a ceasefire after an eight-year old war between the two countries, and to get each country's troops behind its own borders. Although this mission took place in a post-glasnot period, the Security Council  saw no need for it to be more than an observer mission. War did not ensue and the Blue Helmets helped to report and defuse thousands of ceasefire flare-ups. At one point Iraq took several hundred Iranian soldiers hostage and Iran flooded an area in the Khusk region. (The Blue Helmets, 675)

 But the ultimate success may not have been so much due to the Blue Helmets as much as to the fact that Iraq decided to withdraw its forces to pursue invading Kuwait. (Hillen 60) Iraq also returned prisoners of war. This shows that national government cooperation and agendas play a big part in the success or failure of Blue Helmets missions.

 Put in command and control:  "A military force must have common control procedures, such as rules of engagement, operations orders processes, standard operating procedures, reporting formats, modus operandi, training, and doctrine."(Hillen 67 The force us operate under the principles of integrity, authority, responsiveness, effectiveness and unity of command.

 A total 335 observers from 27 countries operated in an ad hoc manner. Perhaps if this mission was in a civil war or a in a jungle where not all parties gave consent, and if it did not follow an enforcement action that worked, it would have spelled disaster. In addition, only one meeting took place between Iraq and Iran during the mission. (Hillen, 77) Thus again, the political underpinnings of the clashes were not addressed or resolved. The cost of this relatively simple operation was $177,895,000. (The Blue Helmets, 678)

UNIKOM

            This mission, which was the first of the 1990s, took place started in April 1991 to monitor the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait after the Persian Gulf War, and to oversee the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of biological and chemical weapons. The Blue Helmets also monitored the Khawr' Abd Allah waterway between the two countries. (Hill and Malik, 68) Observers conducted vehicle checkpoints, ground and air patrols, roadblocks and investigation teams. (The Blue Helmets, 685) For the first time in a peacekeeping mission, all five permanent members of the Security Council  agreed to provide observers.

The cost of the mission, even though it was "only" an observation mission, was over $300,000,000. (The Blue Helmets, 688) There was one observer for every ten kilometers, with basic equipment such as binoculars. (Hill and Malik, 69) This mission was successful because it followed an enforcement action of years, and the Iraqis had little choice but to consent and work with the UN. (Hillen, 35) Even so, Iraqi often violated the DMA. (Hillen, 52)

ONUSAL

United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) took place between July 1991 and April 1995. It was a success. Consent was granted and there were not a lot of militant factions on the ground. The government El Salvador was backed by the US. A communist resistance movement threatened the government. A stalemate was reached by the mid 1980s. The Government of El Salvador underwent talks with its major opponent, leftist Democratica Revolucionara Frente-Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FDR-FMLN). FDR split to from the Convergencia Democratica. A chief opponent was right-wing Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA). (Hill and Malik 71) A 1990 Agreement of Human Rights provided for the establishment of a UN mission.  Further peace talks in New York in 1991 established the creation of the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), a national army, and national police force, and a redefinition of the army’s doctrine.

ONUSAL became “…the first mission to accomplish its tasks of verification and observation of respect for human rights and international humanitarian law during an internal conflict”. (Hill and Malik, 162) Its successes include: demobilization of combatants; free and fair elections; establishment of a new police force; reform of the judicial and electoral system promotion of human rights; formation of a joint army; establishing new democratic institutions; repatriation of displaced persons; establishment of humanitarian aid and Security Council hools;  introducing land reform and introducing an ambitious economic program. (Hill and Malik; 163) Election day was March 20, 1994. A total of 1.5 million voters, or 55 percent of registered voter, voted. This was lower than the Secretary-General wanted, partly because of the low number of polling stations, but the elections were free and fair. (The Blue Helmets, 438)

The UN Mission in EL Salvador (MINUSAL) was sent in to check on the work of ONUSAL. It found that despite the successes, there were some failures. Transition to true democracy did not take place quickly. This was because of different parties’ ideas of democracy. The El Salvador police force was not established quickly. Each party wanted its members to make up a large part of the police force. (Hill and Malik 166) Unemployment and inequality in land ownership were problems. (Hill and Malik 167) The repatriation of soldiers and return of land to landowners was taking long. Reports on electoral defects were watered down. (Hill and Malik, 168) El- Salvador is a small country that had less opposition than Cambodia, Somalia or Yugoslavia. ONUSAL’s success gave credibility to the UN peace process and to the Blue Helmets.

ONUMOZ

            ONUMOZ is a large-Security Council ale, successful observation mission that took place between 1991 and 1994, at time when other missions were failing. There were two rival political parties in Mozambique: pro-Marxist Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO) and the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), backed by South Africa. The colonial power Portugal left in 1975. Mozambique lacked many viable infrastructures and was embroiled in conflicts in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe. Talks in Rome resulted in the General Peace Agreement of 1992. Both parties wanted UN presence to help achieve peace and elections.

Consent, which is very important, was granted to the Blue Helmets. Their tasks were (Hill and Malik, 122 and The Blue Helmets, 324); the verification of the maintenance of the ceasefire; assembly and demobilization of troops; collection of weapons; verification of military locations; assistance in forming a new Mozambique Defense Force; monitoring security along the corridors and main routes of traffic; maintaining police function where the Mozambique police could not; monitor and train police; coordinate and monitor humanitarian operations; clear mines; return refugees displaced by hunger and war; technical and financial assistance for elections and monitoring election of October 27 – October 29, 1993. About 100,000 soldiers were to be disarmed and integrated into regular society. (The Blue Helmets, 324) Therefore, the mission elements were military, political, humanitarian and electoral. As is true in other missions such as Yugoslavia, the military element is needed to secure the other elements.   The Blue Helmets were responsible for the composition of the National Elections Commission, protecting the establishment of Electoral Law by experts and the establishment of the Police Commission. The Blue Helmets component that would monitor all civilian activities was called CIVPOL. Often the Blue Helmets would supervise and protect Non-Government Organizations (NGOs and International experts whether or not it was part of their mandate.

The mission was comprised of over 6,000 Blue Helmets, over 300 observers, over 1,000 civilian police, over 300 international staff and over 500 local staff. (The Blue Helmets, 336)

Problems as late as 1994 included (The Blue Helmets, 329):  opening of some assembly sites; a low number of Portugese-speaking experts and troops; delays in RENAMO demobilization; delays in training of the new national army; initiation and completion of demobilization in certain areas; dismantling of paramilitary forces; ceasefire violations; provision of financial support for the transformation if RENAMO to a political party; and formation of a national army. As was seen in other missions such as Cambodia, troops from various nations often took part in various antics. Some Italian troops were accused of paying local teenagers for sexual favors. (Hill and Malik 133)

Progress continued, however. For instance. 75 percent of displaced persons were relocated by August 1994. By October, the country was ready for free and fair elections. The Blue Helmets and experts from the UN, NGOs and other organizations created over 700 primary Security Council Security Council hools and 250 health facilities were built in rural areas. (The Blue Helmets, 336) At the time that the mission began, 80 percent of primary Security Council Security Council hools in Mozambique had been closed or destroyed. With the help of the Blue Helmets in conjunction with other UN agencies, over 2 million displaced persons and refugees were returned to their place of origin. (The Blue Helmets, 336)               

Nine hundred electoral observers from the UN were present. A total of 5, 402, 940 persons, or 87.9 percent of registered voters, voted. (The Blue Helmets, 334)   

A total of $510,252,500 was spent on this mission. (The Blue Helmets, 337)It was a success, largely because of the overwhelming consent and cooperation of belligerents. Even so, the operation was costly. The  Secretary-General  stated that it was the Mozambicans themselves that bore the ultimate responsibility for success in peace and democracy.                                                                                                                                                                    

UNAVEM I, UNAVEM II, and UNAVEM III

            Angola emerged from Portugese colonialization in 1975, when the Portugese sought to set up a transition program to freedom. A guerilla war for independence had been going on for 15 years. (The Blue Helmets, 233) The three liberation movements were: the Movimento Popular de Libertacao (MPLA), the Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA) and the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA)South African troops opposed MPLA, which was backed by Cuba and the Soviet Union. The US backed UNITA. In addition, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) carried out from bases there its fight against the South African authorities in Namibia. Three agreements in 1988 between Angola, Cuba and South Africa were signed discussing the withdrawal of foreign troops from Angola. UNAVEM I started in 1989 with a 31-month mandate to monitor the withdrawal of Cuban and SWAPO forces in Angola. (The Blue Helmets, 233-235) Clashes occurred between Cuban troops and UNITA. Soldiers were killed. Foreign troops were withdrawn and the mission was a success. This was in large part due to the consent of the Angolan government; the Cuban troops were costing it $20 million a year. This was mostly due to the parties giving consent to the mission and complying with the mandate.  The total cost of UNAVEM I was $16,404,200.

 The Angola Government and UNITA began talks with Portugal and a mediator and the US and Soviet Union as observers. The talks resulted in the Peace Accords of Angola in 1991. They included a ceasefire agreement, principles for peace, and solutions to resolve various issues. It was agreed upon that national elections would be held between September and November 1992. (The Blue Helmets, 238-239) UNAVEM II started to verify the end of the conflict between the Angolan government and UNITA. This 16-month mandate included observing and verifying the first elections, demobilizing troops, forming an army, monitoring police and taking care of humanitarian needs. UNAVEM II would verify the monitoring activities of  MPLA and UNITA observers, supported by Portugal, the US and the Soviet Union, as well as directly support the elections and humanitarian aid. (Hill and Malik, 72) It was composed of mostly observers, police and civilian staff. Although there were no major violations of ceasefire, some violence and poor infrastructure and communications. Problems included those of logistics, transport, organization and resources. By September 1992,  54,737 (45 percent) of Government troops and 7,257 (24 percent) of UNITA troops were demobilized. However, UNAVEM II had its share of problems:  uneven quality of personnel, insufficient tactical mobility and lack of advanced search and track systems. (Hill and Malik, 169)

 The electoral campaign, that took place between the 29th of August and the 28th of September, was conducted without major violence. There were a total of 18 political parties. The Government allegedly controlled radio and television. More troops were demobilized. Presidential and legislative elections were held on the 29th and 30th of September, and were observed by 300 observers. (The Blue Helmets, 244) More than 91 percent of registered voters voted. MPLA won with 53.74 percent of the vote, while UNITA attained 34.1 percent of the vote. (The Blue Helmets, 244) However, problems arose as UNITA officials led by Mr. Jonas  Savimbi proclaimed that the elections were fraudulent. On October 11th, UNITA officials withdrew from the army.  UNITA started to occupy municipalities forcefully and to remove local officials. This was possible because UNITA had not been completely disarmed. (Hill and Malik, 131) In addition, there were not enough observers. Only 4,000 out of the 6,000 polling stations were visited, and not enough observers spoke Portugese. (Hill and Malik, 99) Again,  in the early 1990s, the UN was conducting many missions and was probably not fully financing or empowering one of them. For instance, the UNAVEM II budget was not approved until three months after the operation began. (Hill and Malik, 99)

The Security Council  expanded the mandate to November 30, 1992 by Resolution 785. Heavy violence broke out on October 31. UNAVEM managed to keep a ceasefire. The Secretary General voiced the perhaps if the mission had been more successful in a more complete demobilization, forming an army and forming a neutral police force, violence may not have commenced. Perhaps if more organized troops were no the ground and had the go ahead for peace enforcement, the above would have been handled.

The violence did not stop. The civil war started again and hunger became widespread. The UN established an oil and arms embargo on UNITA. The civil war continued. With Resolution 903 on March 16, 1994, the Security Council  extended the mandate until May 31, 1994 and returned the military and police force to its previous strength. Violence escalated. Months later, a peace agreement was signed at Lusaka. With Resolution 956 and the military was reduced to 350 and the police were reduced to 126. However, heavy fighting continued. The Security Council SR chose the last option and extended the mandate on the 29th of January 1993 for three months. The Secretary General Special Representative tried to Security Council schedule more talks. Violence increased and mission size was decreased. Talks in Abidjan ended in no agreement. UN troops were deployed in Luanda, Lubango, Namibe, Benguela and Sumbe. (The Blue Helmets, 247)  The UN had three options: maintain the mission at its existing strength, reduce provincial deployment in six areas, and to confine it to the capital Luanda and one or two other locations. (The Blue Helmets, 246) 

In October 1993, about 1,000 people a day were dying of murder or starvation. (The Blue Helmets, 253) Relief programs did manage to give away much-needed humanitarian aid. In early 1995, about 3.5 Angolians were receiving humanitarian aid. The cost of UNAVEM II was $175,802,600. The mission had succeeded in some disarmament and demobilization, setting up and monitoring free and fair elections and in delivering humanitarian aid. However, it had fallen short of full disarmament and demobilization and of restoring peace. The mandate and resources were inadequate for this.

UNAVEM III started in 1995 to help the parties restore peace based on agreements reached in Lusaka, Zambia in 1994. The mandate included the areas of politics, military, police humanitarian and electoral.  (The Blue Helmets, 233) The objectives were (The Blue Helmets, 256): 1. (political) assist in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol with good offices and mediation; 2. (military) to supervise, control and verify the disengagement of forces and monitor ceasefire; (police) verify and monitor the neutrality of the Angolan National Police, disarming of civilians and security arrangements for UNITA leadership; 4. (humanitarian) coordinate, facilitate and support humanitarian activities; and (electoral) support, verify and monitor second presidential elections. Implemented the protocol took long. But supply routes were opened and mines were cleared.  Unarmed BH were attacked sometimes. Fighting decreased, and President dos Santos met with Mr. Savimbi four times. Then violence again escalated. But as the leader consent to the UN mission increased, the violence decreased. The military situation stabilized and more troops were demobilized.  (The Blue Helmets, 263)

On March 31, 1996, there were 6,576 troops and support personnel in Angola, along with 226 civilian police. The mission ended on May 8, 1996. UNAVEM III cost the UN $366,523,900. (The Blue Helmets, 265)  

Traditional Peacekeeping Missions (PKI)

Hillen (22) writes that the primary military objective of most traditional PK missions was to occupy a clearly recognized and linear interpositional buffer zone, which gave the small PK contingents a mechanism to stretch and multiply humble military capabilities. Troops were to use force in self-defense or in defense of a mandate when under armed attack. The buffer zone was sometimes in existence before the Blue Helmets arrived. Politics professor Paul Diehl (Hillen, 80) writes that PKI is “…the imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following a cessation of armed hostilities, and with the permission of the state on whose territory these forces are deployed, in order to discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an environment under which the underlying dispute can be resolved.”

According to the International Peace Cooperation Law, the following are components of PK (Harrison and Nishihara, 105):

1. monitoring the observance of cessation of armed conflict and relation, withdrawal and demobilization; 4. collection, storage and disposal of abandoned weapons; 5. assistance to designate ceasefire lines; 6. assistance for the exchange of prisoners of war among the parties to armed conflicts; 7. medical care such as sanitation; 8. transportation, communication and construction; 9. supervision and management of elections; 10. advice, guidance and training of police; and 11. advice or guidance for administrative matters.

According to Hillen (81), PKI were subject to improvisation inconsistency, unresponsiveness ineffectiveness and helplessness in the event of no host consent.

UNEF I and UNEF II

            UNEF I (1956-1967) was put in place after Egypt President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalization of the much-used Suez Canal. UNEF I was established to secure the ceasefire between Israel and Egypt. (Hill and Malik, 33) Israel found this reason to denounce the 1949 Armistice Agreement. Britain and France, due to lose a lot of money from the closure of the canal, invaded Egypt along with Israel. France suspected Nasser of aiding Algerian nationalists. US dissatisfaction with British and French policy led to the setting up of UNEF I. This shows the influence of one of the two superpowers of the world at the time.

            UNEF I was to supervise the withdrawal of foreign troops in Egypt, patrol border areas to secure a ceasefire, form a buffer zone between French-Israeli and Egyptian forces, and to strengthen the provisions covering the Egypt-Israeli Armistice Agreements of 1949. Israel did not allow UNEF I on its borers, so the Blue Helmets were stationed I Egypt. UNEF I could not prevent an attack, but it did secure a buffer zone, which lent it credibility. It also set up precedents later used in ONUC, UNIFIL, UNDOF and UNFICYP. It was successful in having Israel retreat and in greatly decreasing ceasefire violations. (The Blue Helmets, 54) Then the UNEF I mission was to observe ceasefire.

            UNEF I power was enough to instill confidence on both sides that steps toward peace would not be undone. But the fact that it was not an enforcement mission and that Blue Helmets levels were not so high limited it strength. Five battalions were in charge of 50 kilometers around the Gaza strip. This was enough. But two battalions were in charge of 214 kilometers. And 187 kilometers were manned only by UNEF aircraft. (Hillen, 102-103)     

            In 1967 Israel and Syria exchanged fire over a dispute about cultivation rights I the demilitarized area of Lake Tiberias. UNEF I ended with the Arab-Israeli war in 1967. Egypt requested the Blue Helmets to leave. This shows the importance of consent. It also shows that, if there is no mandate to allow force and superpower backing with trained troops and finances, many UN missions have a limited power to deter violence or war. It also shows that, if the UN did not address underlying reasons of violence, it was unable to maintain peace.                                                                                                                                                                                             

            Two Arab-Israeli wars started and finished between 1967 and 1973. UNEF II (1974-1979) was important in setting up a buffer zone between Israel and Egypt and I diffusing a crisis that may have brought a superpower confrontation into the Middle East.

            Renewed fighting between Israel, Egypt and Syria in 1973 led Egypt and several UN countries to request a new force. UNEF II was the force and it began operations in 1973. Israel opposed contingents from Ghana, Indonesia, Poland and Senegal, countries that had not yet started diplomatic relations with it.  UNEF II objectives were to top fighting, prevent movement of troops forward, provide humanitarian aid where needed, and provide non-military supplies to Suez city and the Egyptian Third Army trapped on the east bank of the Suez Canal. (The Blue Helmets, 64)

ONUC

            ONUC (1960-1964) was the first UN mission to use as many as 20,000 Blue Helmets. Its mission spanned the area of 2,345,000 squared kilometers of chaotic, changing, jungle tribal terrain in the Congo. (Hill and Malik, 37) The colonial power Belgium withdrew gave the colony independence in 1959. Congo requested UN help with military advisers, and in developing and strengthening the national army. (The Blue Helmets, 176) Its objectives were to help restore law and order in the Congo and to ascertain the withdrawal of Belgian troops.  The tasks ad responsibilities were outside the realm of peacekeeping, yet troops were authorized to use force only in self-defense, except in the matter of Resolution 169, to end Katanga's secession. Thus ONUC is noted as an antecedent to PKII operations. (Hillen, 145)

            Several factions in the Congo wanted power in the upcoming government. A large faction was Patrice Lumumba's nationalist, centrist party the Mouvement Nationale Congolese (MNC). Another was Moise Tshombe's federalist Confederation des Association Tribales du Katanga, which wanted the rich southern region to be independent of any Congolese government. This caused tensions in the Security Council . In addition, Belgian troops began to land in Katanga in 1960, in violation of the Treaty of Friendship between the two countries. (Hill and Malik, 38) In addition, by 1960 the Congo was divided into four camps, each claiming to be the righteous government of the country. (The Blue Helmets, 183) In November 1960, Mr. Lumumba was captured by ANC factions and later killed. (The Blue Helmets, 183) Fighting ensued. The Security Council  authorized the Blue Helmets to use force as a last resort to prevent civil war.

Tshombe announced in 1961 that Katanga would not secede. However, he seemed to change his mind and attacked the ONUC at several areas.  Secretary-General  Dag Hammarskjold flew to Ndola, in what was then Northern Rhodesia, to meet with Mr. Tshombe. The airplane crashed and he died, along with seven other UN staff members and a Swedish crew. (The Blue Helmets, 192)The new  Secretary-General  U Thant, announced that the mandates of ONUC had been fulfilled and the mission began a phased withdrawal that ended in June 1964. (Hill and Malik 40) By January 1963, however, ONUC had restored law and order in Katanga and the guerilla fighters there ceased to exist as a fighting force. (The Blue Helmets, 195) The Blue Helmets also trained air traffic controllers, agriculture assistants, labor officials, foresters, medical professionals and police.

            ONUC was a success in terms of preventing even greater violence, monitoring the withdrawal of Belgium troops, training personnel, save a quarter of a million lives by delivering humanitarian aid such as food (The Blue Helmets, 197), restoring law and order in Katanga, and leaving the Congo with a viable government, but it failed to deliver a political solution to underlying hostilities between factions. Law and order was not fully restored. The UN concluded again that locals are ultimately responsible for their government.

            Since 1999, the Blue Helmets have been present in the Congo again in the United Nations Democratic Region in the Democratic Republic of Congo to prevent anti-government rebels from mounting insurrections and to monitor a peace agreement between the Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe. About 600 Indian Blue Helmets are in the country. An Indian peacekeeper was killed as late as December 2005, according to Global Newswire of the Panafrican News Agency.Unted Nat

GO ENFORCEMENT HERE *ions Organization Mion in the Democratic Republic of the Congo United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

UNIFIL

            The civil war in Lebanon had ended in 1976. But fighting in Southern Lebanon had not stopped. Hillen(109) classifies UNIFIL (1978-Present) as a classic case of PKI:  "The political and strategic tenets that determined its force structure, command and control structure, and military objectives were derived from the practice of successful traditional peacekeeping missions." The obstacles and failures of this mission showed the UN that PKI may not suffice in an environment that is not friendly. Some characteristics of this mission resemble PKII characteristics: many warring and hostile factions, a heavily-populated, vague buffer zone and focus on protecting humanitarian aid.

            There were tribes and guerilla warfare in southern Lebanon. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was under no authority. The operational plan for UNIFIL was put together in less than a day, and included military objectives and modus operandi, command structure, area of operations, control procedures, structure and compositions. (Hillen 110) Mission planning had to take place. (Hillen 111) This included: a deliberate planning process designed to eliminate as many operation uncertainties as possible, analyzing the mission, creating and analyzing action, choosing a course of action and estimating situations.  The terms of reference were vague. (Hillen 112) There was no clearly defined area and the Security Council  was not completely sure of consent. (Hillen 113)

            The military objectives (Hillen 128) were: to confirm Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) withdrawal from southern Lebanon, to restore peace and security and to assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its authority. Troops were to use force only in self-defense.

            The composition of the Blue Helmets was characterized by a disparity in organization, equipment and capability. (Hillen 114) Some battalions had heavy machine guns and light mortars. There was one French antitank recoilless rifle. The heaviest weapons were 120-mm mortars that were an organized fire support component of the Dutch battalion. One problem was that, the more militarily sophisticated the national forces, the more difficult it was to recruit and from ad hoc operations that were neutral, representative of all UN member states, and capable of integrated, coordinated operations. Interoperability was made difficult because of the diversity in training, doctrine, tactical methods equipment, planning procedures, command and control processes and soldier perspectives. Soldier rotation in each battalion differed.

Control procedures were uncoordinated, inconsistent and unsynchronized. Tribal factions took advantage of this. They also took advantage of the disparity in different soldiers' perspectives and behaviors. They behaved differently with sympathetic battalions. For instance, Moslem elements perceived the French to be pro-Lebanese Christian (because of historical reasons) ad anti-Iranian because of support for Iraq). The French battalion withdrew in 1986.

            A total of 4,000 troops were approved for the mission initially. (Hillen 116) This was increased to 6,000 troops. It was further increased to a ceiling of 7,000 troops after the Israeli invasion of 1982. (Hillen 116) There was a constant turnover of forces. This and maintaining neutrality made it a tough task for the Secretariat to constantly recruit troops. (Hillen 120) The Dutch battalion deployed in 1979 was withdrawn in 1985. The Dutch government stated that UNIFIL does not seem able to fulfill its mandate. (Hillen 123)

            Command and control, interoperability and management were poor. There was not much local consent. As in other mission, the UN "hoped" that locals would cooperate. Hope is not a strategic plan. In 1993 the IDF launched a large military operation of air strikes and artillery attacks. The IDF did not respect the UNIFIL, flying its reconnaissance aircraft over southern Lebanon and setting up positions and laying mines there. . UNIFIL did manage to coordinate and deliver humanitarian aid. Overall, UNIFIL failed in establishing a buffer zone and restoring peace.

            According to the last  Secretary-General  report on UNIFIL, there continue to be IDF and Arab (Such as Hizbollah) attacks. UNIFIL has made a difference, however. Each time the mandate came up for renewal, mukhtars (village elders) wrote to the  Secretary-General  to ask him not to withdraw the force. Israel at different points used naval vessels to impose restrictions on Lebanese fishermen. (The Blue Helmets, 107 and 103) UNIFIL has done what it could, with its limitations in using self-defense and the array of other problems, to mitigate violence and to protect civilians. (The Blue Helmets, 105)

            The continued failures of UNIFIL caused a "resigned outlook of impending failure" at the UN, and the renewal of the mandate was "...an expression of political perseverance more than the prospects of operational success." (Hillen, 137)
Peacekeeping after the Cold War – PKII

According to Harrison and Nishihara (18), PKII was a result of some world realities after the Cold War: the solution of certain US-Soviet conflicts, including those in developing nations; less vetoes in the Security Council increase in intrastate violence; the forceful and more balanced asserting by the West of it commitment to democracy and human rights; and the independence of several colonies. The Blue Helmets often tried to actively do the following, according to Hillen (26): protect the delivery of humanitarian aid; disarm and mobilize belligerents, maintain and protect safe areas, enforce demilitarized (DMZ) zones; monitor human rights violations; repatriate refugees, assume temporary control of some government functions; train government and police; and set up elections.

SG Boutros-Boutros Ghali wrote the Agenda for Peace in 1992. He wrote that enforcement may be vital in some instances and the consent of belligerents is not always necessary for UN missions to take place.

PKII is characterized by unstable intrastate conflicts. (Hillen, 141) Alternative names for PKII include (Hillen, 144): aggravated peacekeeping, wider peacekeeping, expanded peacekeeping, enhanced peacekeeping, broader peacekeeping, muscular peacekeeping, protected peacekeeping, peacemaking and even inducement operations.

 PKII operations such as UNPROFOR, UNAMIR and UNOSOMII pushed the Blue Helmets into a grey area between peacekeeping and enforcement. PKII needed  "...the political legitimacy and military authority to rapidly mobilize, deploy and direct the operations of large, complex, and coercive military forces. (Hillen, 181)

The PKII missions reviewed will be UNTAG, UNTAC, UNPROFOR, UNAMIR and UNOSOM II.

UNTAG

            United Nations Transition Assistance Group (1989 - 1990) was the first major peacekeeping operation after the Cold War. WP The objective was the decolonialization of South West Africa into Namibia, and involved the withdrawal of Cuban troops. (Hill and Malik, 65) Other objectives involved to monitor democratic elections, the actions of the South West African Police (SWAPOL), disarming civilian commando units, ethnic forces, and SWAPOL units, and the ceasefire. (Hill and Malik, 65-66) The UN police CIVPOL monitored SWAPOL. It was a successful mission that enjoyed the consent of belligerents. At its height, UNTAG included 8,000 men and women, civilians, police and military, from 120 countries. (The Blue Helmets, 203) Germany had control of the colony until the World War I, when an invasion of South Africa defeated the Germans in 1915.

 The Blue Helmets and other UN officials saw to it that political prisoners and detainees were to be released in order to vote, and no discriminatory law that would abridge this right would exist. (The Blue Helmets, 205) Amnesty was granted to political exiles for the same reason. Ten parties registered. The elections were a huge success: over 97 percent of registered voters voted. (The Blue Helmets, 227)

 The Blue Helmets revamped Namibian information network: 42 political offices reached out to people in the form of radio, television, newspapers, visual materials and word-of-mouth. (The Blue Helmets, 220) More than 200 radio programs, 32 television programs and 590,000 information items were produced. (The Blue Helmets, 220)

 The new President was Sam Nujoma. The Constitution, which UN officials helped to draft, was adopted on February 12, 1990. (The Blue Helmets, 228)

There were still difficulties. Preparation time was short and the budget was reduced. At one point, two US military transport specialists transported vehicles by sea rather than air to reduce costs. This resulted in the mission beginning operations with a lack of equipment. Planning oversight also resulted in personnel buying maps from local bookstores. (Hill and Malik, 83) Election problems included language diversity and unfamiliarity with ballots.

 The cost was $368,584,324 no small sum. (The Blue Helmets, 228)

UNTAC

            The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia took place between March 1992 and September 1993 and involved disarming 550,000 army and militia forces by setting up 84 cantonment sites and 20 checkpoints. (Hillen, 171) Hillen classifies this as the “most comprehensive United Nations attempt to disarm and demobilize belligerents”. (Hillen, 171) There were several warring factions and the terrain was jungle. One faction, the Party of Democratic Kampuchea, or` Khmer Rouge, a communist force backed by China, decided to not cooperate when the Blue Helmets were on the ground. This was a major issue for the UN. The Blue Helmets failed to disarm all belligerents, disarming only one-fifth. (Hillen, 172)

            Cambodia was a French colony until the 1950s. Political instability ensued. Pol Pot, the head of the Khmer Rouge, ruled Cambodia between 1975 and 1979. About 2 million Cambodians died under his regime. The people were subjected to social reconstruction, re-education and harsh labor. (The Blue Helmets, 449) The nation of nine-million was strategic. Through the years, the US, France, Soviet Union and China had tried to control its government. The Soviet Union, China and Vietnam backed Pol Pot. The Security Council could not agree on the  mission so at first the General Assembly took over in peace talks and organizing the mission. The UN organized the United Nations Advanced Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), a hastily assembled good offices mission mandated to liaise between conflicting parties while organizing an operational assessment. (Hillen, 102) It was later absorbed into UNTAC.

This gave the UN a false sense of security. The Comprehensive Political Settlement of Cambodia, or Paris Peace Accords, committed the four Cambodian factions to a ceasefire. The UN was to monitor the ceasefire and to maintain a neutral political environment conducive to free and fair elections. (Hill and Malik, 74) The UN role also included: the location and confiscation of military weapons and supplies; the oversight of civil administration and maintenance of law and order; the promotion and protection of human rights; the repatriation resettlement of refugees and displaced people; and rehabilitation of infrastructure, including economic. (Hill and Malik, 75) Therefore, UNTAC consisted of these components: human rights, electoral, military, civil administration, civilian police, repatriation, and rehabilitation. (The Blue Helmets, 456)

            A first problem was the delay in deployment of the Blue Helmets. Political analyst Trevor Findlay attributed this to: “…that the UN Secretariat lacked the experience, resources and qualified personnel to organize a mission of such complexity, magnitude, and novelty at short notice”. (Hillen, 160)He also noted that the UN often organized its Blue Helmets missions around the idea of the best-case, not the worst-case Security Council enario, and that UNTAC was once example of this. (Hillen, 165-166)e Blue Helmets were not authorized to use force and so were often ineffective. For instance, in the Spring of 1992  Secretary-General  Special Representative Akashi and Lieutenant General Sanderson were stopped at a makeshift roadblock composed of a bamboo stick and a few Khmer Rouge soldiers. The Blue Helmets decided to turn back. (Hill and Malik, 175)

            Another problem was lack of training and expertise on the part of some soldiers. For instance, amongst the Bulgarian battalion, only one soldier spoke English, which was not good for command and control. Many of the Bulgarian soldiers were recent convicts, and all of them had at most two months of training. A total of fifty-six Bulgarian soldiers, including eight officers, were sent home. (Hill and Malik , 156) Many soldiers engaged in prostitution. A single German hospital was dealing with about 45 venereal disease cases of soldiers each day. (Hill and Malik, 132) A UN medic said that about 150 cases of AIDS would result from the mission. (Hill and Malik, 132)  To allow enforcement action against the Khmer Rouge would make the UN seem partial, as it did to some in its dealings with the Bosnian Serbs in UNPROFOR. (Hillen, 171) UNTAC did not have the staff or knowledge to establish a transitional government.

            About UNTAC, then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said that it was: “…an elephantine bureaucracy [had] been asked to do gymnastics”. (Hill and Malik, 130) Even when the Blue Helmets withdrew, the Secretary-General  noted that Cambodia still needed help in the following: security, stability, mine-clearance, infrastructure, and economic and social development. (The Blue Helmets, 472)

Hillen calls UNTAC a “qualified success”; the problems was temporarily solved, but the Blue Helmets did not disarm various warring factions. UNTAC did not secure a corruption-free government, withdrawal of foreign forces, did not foster an environment in which the respect for human rights would be ensured. (Hill and Malik, 129) At first, there were only ten officers in charge of stopping human rights violations. There was not even a jail to encarcerate those that did not respect human rights. The UN police, the CIVPOL, were unarmed. There was also a lack of equipment. The electoral component had only one personal computer. (Hill and Malik, 131) Ceasefire violations occurred routinely.  Several Blue Helmets were killed.

The successes of UNTAC were: adoption of electoral law, return of 365,000 refugees and displace persons, cantoning of about 53,000 troops, beginning the process for social and economic rehabilitation, and collecting of about 50,000 weapons. (Hill and Malik, 97 and 124) The Khmer Rouge was not a legitimate force any more. It was supported only by the Thai, and had backed out of elections and lost power. About 2,000 of its soldiers had defected. (Hill and Malik, 125) Humanitarian aid in food, housing medical care was provided to many people. Human rights and democracy training were introduced into education and the public by a rigorous information campaign, including a radio station, videos, posters and advertisements. Education for judges, lawyers, police and other legal professionals was begun.

Elections did take place on May 23 – 28, 1993. A total of 4,267,192 voters, or 89.56 percent of registered voters, voted. (The Blue Helmets, 471) A new 12-member assembly would draw up a constitution with the help of UN experts. The total cost for this “qualified success” was $1,620,963,300. (The Blue Helmets, 481) The  Secretary-General  did consider UNTAC a success in having filled the goal of the Paris Accords: restoring political leaders to Cambodia who were responsible for peace, stability and national reconciliation and reconstruction. (The Blue Helmets, 481)

UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II

            After the debacle of watching dead US soldiers on video, the US Government decided to decrease the share of Blue Helmets funding from 32 percent to 25 percent. (Hill and Malik, 198) This was a blow to the UN. The cost of peacekeeping I 1995 was $3.1 billion. 

UNPROFOR

            UNPROFOR (March 1992 to December 1995) was a big mission full of obstacles. It first referred to a mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Macedonia. Starting on March 31, 1995, the name only referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here is where UNPROFOR received its biggest obstacles, and it is what UNPROFOR refers to in this section. The Bosnian Serbs saw the Blue Helmets as not being impartial. The mandate was vague: to ensure that the protected areas were demilitarized, monitor local police and ensure non-discrimination and protection of human rights. (The Blue Helmets, 513) NATO was brought in to help, and the underlying source of tension was again not resolved. This mission had a corps-sized mechanized ground force, large and sophisticated supporting air force and a fleet of advance warships off the Adriatic. (Hillen, 152) The mission was composed of humanitarian, military, electoral, civil administration, repatriation and rehabilitation components. There were 27 combat battalions: light, motorized or mechanized infantry, and armored reconnaissance units. Other battalions were: medical, engineer, communication, transportation, aviation and general support. By November 1994, the total number of personnel, Blue Helmets and other, were 39,000. (Hillen, 153)

            Originally, UNPROFOR consisted of Blue Helmets, CIVPOL and civilian components and was authorized to enter three UN protected Areas in Croatia: Eastern Slovania, Western Slavonia and Krajina. These areas were chosen because of their majority or large minority of Serbs. (Hill and Malik, 106) The  Secretary-General  saw UNPROFOR as a success because of the humanitarian aid that it delivered the ceasefires that it negotiated. (The Blue Helmets, 563) Eventually, a NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) took over for UNPROFOR. Under Resolution 1031, the Security Council  authorized it to take any measures necessary to implement the peace agreement of Dayton Peace Accords of November 1995. At the time of its peak deployment in August 1995, UNPROFOR an the other two Yugoslavia missions accounted for almost 70 percent of peacekeepers and over two-thirds of peacekeeping costs worldwide. (The Blue Helmets, 563)

            The Blue Helmets went into Yugoslavia before any peace agreement. Ceasefires were not respected often. The environment was belligerent with ethnic cleansing, burning and looting of villages, organized rape of women, and heavy bombing. UN operations were again ad hoc, improvised and with little training. The UN relied on the hope that things would get better. Cooperation from the Bosnian Serbs was mostly non-existent and safe areas were often violently attacked. Starting on October 9, 1992 a “no-fly zone” except for UN and NATO aircraft was implemented over Bosnia-Herzegovina. The mandate of the mission was expanded 12 times. (Hillen, 148) This was an instance of mission creep, where mandates were expanded in time and force. (Hillen, 148 and Hill and Malik, 105) This was often the case, as in UNTAC and UNOSOM II. This implied a “…disconnection between political objectives and military means…” Hillen, 147) UNPROFOR Blue Helmets were given a vague mandate to begin with, and resorted to peacemaking in order to deliver humanitarian aid. (Hill and Malik, 105)

UNPROFOR was given the go-ahead to use enforcement against some factions in order to deliver humanitarian aid, but did not do so until May 1995, over three years into the mission. (Hillen, 142) This authorization was later taken away, and the Blue Helmets were to protect humanitarian aid with passive force. Humanitarian aid needed: storage sites, airports and sea ports, main supply routes and distribution sites to be safe and operative. (Hillen, 173) NGO members delivering humanitarian aid needed Blue Helmets protection. In UNPROFOR, there were over 150 NGOs, and only 41 coordinated their operations with UNPROFOR. (Hillen, 173) Furthermore, some NGOs were partial.

Troops were often not sent on time. With so many large UN operations taking place in the early 1990s, the precariousness of the condition in Bosnia, and the typically slow procurement of troops by the UN, not many countries volunteered troops. For instance, when in 1993 the UN commander in Bosnia estimated that he would need 34,000 more troops to protect humanitarian aid. (Hillen,153).  The  Secretary-General , knowing that this number was too high, authorized an additional 7,600 troops. Nine months later, only 5000 troops had deployed to Bosnia. (Hillen, 154) In addition, for a mission such as UNPROFOR, only First World countries were able to deliver troops with the standard, logistics, medical and engineering contingents, communication, transportation and aviation units needed. In March 1994, Great Britain and France provided 25 percent of the Blue Helmets, other European nations made up 50 percent, and countries from the rest of the world made up a quarter.

With the quantity of troops needed in the early 1990s, quality was often compromised. For instance, Pakistan offered troops in 1994 but did not send them because they lacked basic equipment. Furthermore, as in UNTAC, some battalions were censored due to their actions. Russian, Ukrainian and Nigerian units were censored for racketeering, illegal dealings with weapons and fuel, prostitution, drug dealing and more. (Hillen, 156)

Interoperability was an issue. With the troops from various countries, there was little: common doctrine, training, command and control, communication, equipment and standards of professionalism. (Hillen, 157) In addition to all the problems with troops, the special representative to the  Secretary-General , who was the liaison between ground commanders and the  Secretary-General , did not arrive until January 1994, 22 months after mission had been authorized in Croatia and 19 months after it was extended to Bosnia. (Hillen, 161) The time that it took for commands to go from the ground to any UN center was long. For instance, a UNPROFOR military staff member in the summer of 1993 estimated that the process between a battalion commander requesting an item from UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb took 52 separate steps. (Hill and Malik, 131) Command from the Secretariat was often not realistic. Lieutenant General Francis Briquemont said: “I don’t read the Security Council resolutions any more because they don’t’ help me”. (Hill and Malik, 145)It seems that the UN resolutions did to resolve much.

At a time when Muslim enclaves in Bosnia were constantly under siege, passive warfare did not work. For instance, the Blue Helmets tried to evacuate children, women and elderly from Srebrenica. The result was a stampede in which many people were killed on the way to Tuzla. (Hill and Malik, 143) The Security Council  passed Resolution 824, declaring Srebenica and surrounding towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac and Sarajevo safe areas. More Blue Helmets were sent there. But this failed to prevent further attacks. (Hill and Malik, 143) For instance, Gorazde was hit by Bosnian Serb militia for 18 days. In March 1993, 30 to 40 people were dying daily from military action or starvation. (The Blue Helmets, 525) The Security Council  had passed Resolution 836 on June 6, 1993 authorizing UNPROFOR to act in self defense and take necessary measures, even force, in reply to Bosnian Serb bombardments against the safe areas. But the necessary 34,000 troops were not there to reinforce this. It is less, likely for a small number of uncoordinated troops to take actions of force against a united, strong enemy. In addition, the UN did not have the money to finance such a huge imperative. The role of UNPRFOR was reduced by September 1993. One UN report stated that it was this: “…to prevent the resumption or escalation of conflict; to provide a breathing space for the continued efforts of peacemakers; and to support the provision of essential humanitarian assistance”. (Hill and Malik, 144)

A mortar attack on a Sarajevo marketplace ion February 5, 1994 prompted international outrage and caused the  Secretary-General  to issue the threat of more air strikes. It was mostly the NATO air force that acted offensively. Prior to this time, NATO had acted offensively only eight times in the first 710 days of its cooperation “Deny Flight”, and this was out of over 36,500 combat sorties. (Hillen, 142-143) The NATO air force acted to defend UNPROFOR ground troops, to hit Bosnian Serbs threatening safe areas and to hit a Bosnian-Serb surface-to-air missile site. (Hillen, 177) Besides the NATO air force, the UN used NATO troops from France, Holland and Great Britain to shell Bosnian Serb forces with 155-mm artillery and 120-mm mortars on Mount Igman, overlooking Sarajevo. (Hillen, 152) NATO troops had rehearsed combat operations, uniform control and command and heavy weapons. However, the ground operation was mostly peacekeeping. The NATO secretary-general did not think that this dichotomy worked:  “I do not believe, however, that we can pursue decisive peace enforcement from the air while the UN is led, deployed, and equipped for peacekeeping on the ground. If we have learned anything from this conflict, it is that we cannot mix these two missions.” (Hillen, 177)

UNHCR reported that since May 1994, only 12 aid convoys with less than 2,000 metric tons of food had reached 400,000 people in Bihac. (The Blue Helmets, 535) Between February and April 1994, the Bosnian Serbs signed and complied with a ceasefire around Gorazde. By September 1994, 3,500 more Blue Helmets were sent in, after Resolution 900 calling for 8,250 additional troops. (The Blue Helmets, 531) Nevertheless, in late 1994 fighting resumed between the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Croats against Bosnian Serbs in areas such as Bijac. Even after 39 warplanes took part in a NATO raid around Bihac in November 1994, the Bosnian Serbs continued their attack. The Blue Helmets , 536) Perhaps ground enforcement was needed. President Carter visited the area. The Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serbs signed a ceasefire that included: a four-month cessation of hostilities; the establishment of a joint commission to oversee implementation of the agreement; an exchange of liaison officers; the separation of forces, withdrawal of heavy weapons; restoration of utilities and economic activities; release of prisoners; information on missing persons; and freedom of movement for Blue Helmets and relief workers. (The Blue Helmets, 537) After a month of decreasing violence, the Bosnian Serbs violated the ceasefire and restricted UNPROFOR movement.

Without the all-important consent from the Bosnian Serbs, even the air strikes were often fruitless. For instance, in November 1994 NATO bombed Bosnian Serb artillery and tank positions attacking Bihac. This had no lasting effect since the Bosnian Serbs, led by Radovan Karadzic, started to deny UNPROFOR freedom of movement and then activated surface-to-air missile batteries. (Hillen, 177) The US, with no troops on the ground, preferred force. On September 10, 1994, it launched 13 Tomahawk cruise missiles. This was the first time that these missiles were used in peace enforcement. (Hill and Malik, 182)

            In terms of humanitarian aid, UNPROFOR can be said to be a success. In 1993 alone it protected almost 5,000 UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) convoys and administered Sarajevo airport and the airlift that delivered 71 percent of Sarajevo’s food. (Hillen, 172) However, the humanitarian aid did not do much to affect the objectives of the mandate.  According to political analyst Dominique Jacquin-Berdal: “…when humanitarian operations serve as a substitute for dealing with the root cause of conflict or as compensation for diplomatic failures, formulation of realizable military objectives becomes extremely difficult. More seriously still, it may prolong the conflict by drawing attention away from its underlying sources.” (Hillen, 174) Delivering humanitarian aid required huge missions and sometimes enabled the belligerents to keep fighting. (Hillen, 174)

UNPROFOR undoubtedly prevented some minor fighting and delivered huge amounts of humanitarian aid. It probably did more to delay, rather than prevent fighting. (The Blue Helmets, 340) But in smooth functioning of a large UN mission, peacemaking, and getting to the source of hostilities, it was a failure. Gomport in Foreign Affairs called UNPROFOR a failure. Bass in the same magazine called it “hapless”. Although the  Secretary-General  said that the task of UNPROFOR was not peacemaking, that is what it often had to do.

UNAMIR

            The Untied Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (October 1993- March 1996) took place in Rwanda, on e of the most densely-populated countries in the world. It is composed of the tribes Hutu (about 85 percent), Tutu (about 14 percent) and Twa (about 1 percent). (The Blue Helmets, 341) Regional rivalries and ethnic tension plagued the country. In 1990 the President announced that the country would be open to democratization and multi-party rule. An attack was launched across the Rwanda-Ugandan border by the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), which consisted of mostly Tutsis. (The Blue Helmets, 341)

            The result was that all Rwandan Tutsis were considered accomplices. Uganda and Rwanda asked the UN for help. A UN observer mission, the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) was established o the Ugandan side of the border. The Arusha talks took place between Uganda and Rwanda.

In August 1993 a UN reconnaissance mission visited Rwanda and recommended UNAMIR.  The principle functions would be: to assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; to monitor the cease-fire agreement; establish a demilitarized zone; stabilize security for elections; administer humanitarian aid; return displaced persons; and clear mines. (The Blue Helmets, 343-344) Military observers of UNOMUR came under the command of the new mission.

The situation the country often was chaotic.  The ceasefire was often violated. Ethnic cleansing occurred. Villages were booted. Political leaders and civilians were murdered.  The mandate kept getting extended. The genocide claimed between 500,00 t o one million victims. (The Blue Helmets, 346) Disease level in camps was rampant. Violent events increased after the airplane crash involving the deaths of Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana and Burundi President Cyprien Ntaryamira. The causes of the crash are unknown. An interim government set up mostly of Hut extremists was established.  Oxfam pulled out and Belgium and French Blue Helmets insisted that they had no mandate to restore order, and were only responsible with the safe evacuation of foreign nationals. By May 1994, the RPF occupied half of Rwanda. Civilian men, women and children were hacked to death of blown up with grenades. The Belgium battalion withdrew from UNAMIR.

UN options at this point were three: 1. reinforce the mission with huge numbers of Blue Helmets; send a smaller force to Kigali; and withdraw. The US wanted to withdraw. Albright helped to change the US position to the second option. (Hill and Malik, 193)

In May 1994, the  Secretary-General  warned the interim government to stop acts of genocide. The  Secretary-General  sent an additional 5,500 troops to the area. (The Blue Helmets, 350) Considering the atrocities, this was a small figure. By this time, there were about 1.5 million displaced persons, and about 400,000 refugees in other countries. (The Blue Helmets, 351) RPF took military control over most of the country, including Kigali, by July 1994. In a two-week period in July, 1.5 million refugees left Rwanda for Zaire. (The Blue Helmets, 353) By now, 3 million out of a total population of seven million people were displaced.

The Security Council  passed Resolution 918, authorizing an arms embargo under Chapter Seven. It found it extremely difficult to get troops to enforce it. Only Ghana, Ethiopia ad Senegal sent troops initially, at 800 each. This was probably because their armies needed the money. After the promise of these troops, the US gave the go ahead for the force’s deployment. The French Blue Helmets withdrew and were replaced by Ghanaians and Ethiopian troops. Turnover did to give way to a functioning body of Blue Helmets troops.

The  Secretary-General  noted that the UN did not have the funds for humanitarian needs of the people of Rwanda, and launched a $434.8 million appeal to the world. (The Blue Helmets, 353) This shows how the UN does not have the funds it needs, how it was involved in many missions in the early 1990s (overcommittment) and how, without the financial and military backing of a superpower and sufficient financing and military power, certain complex missions cannot succeed.

The Blue Helmets started to train local police. They helped to establish a radio station, court systems and prisons. Members of several Security Council  countries visited Rwanda in 1995. However, the situation continued to deteriorate. There were anti-UNAMIR protesters, and many UNAMIR officials were not allowed access to the Kigali Airport.

In 1995 UNAMIR was downsized to reflect its new mission of normalization instead of security. UNAMIR continued to assist in the repatriation of refugees and delivery of humanitarian aid. This shows the inability of the mission to fulfill its security roles.  The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and United National Development Program helped to build programs to increase the country’s capacity for human, economic, and financial resources. By January 1996, the Canadian Government announced that it would withdraw its troops since the reduced troop level would render the mandate unachievable. (The Blue Helmets, 371) By early February 1996, UNAMIR Blue Helmets numbered 1,200 and military observers numbered 200. (The Blue Helmets, 371) A UN office was established in Rwanda with the government’s consent after Blue Helmets withdrawal in 1996. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights had suggested that 120 human rights field officers be present, but there were not enough funds for this.

UNAMIR had helped to administer some humanitarian aid and no doubt had prevented some military squirmishes from happening. However, all in all, it was an abject failure and showed the UN’s inability to muster the command and control, troop level, finances, and international agreement to quell a situation such as the one in Rwanda. Hill and Malik (197) write:  “If the catastrophe in Somalia had dealt a deadly blow to the proposed creation of a ‘New World Order”, then Rwanda was to be the place it finally died”.

Peace Enforcement

According to Harrison and Nishihara (19), peace enforcement lacks the essential prerequisite for peacekeeping: the consent of parties involved before or after a final settlement, and the restriction of use of arms to self-defense. The objective of PE is to restore international peace and security. (Harrison and Nishihara, 19) Peace enforcement with the Blue Helmets took place fully under Chapter VII Article 42 only I Korea (1950 - 1953 ) and the Persian Gulf War in Iraq (1990 1991- ). Both of these actions perhaps required US military authority to mobilize, command, control and organize the military resources needed to succeed. The UN was a useful political, but not military, forum in conflicts of this Security Council ale. (Hillen, 225)

Korea

            On June 25, 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea. US troops went to assist South Korea. British and Australian troops landed in South Korea soon afterward. The response was legitimate under Article 51, which sated the right of states to individual and collective self-defense. Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council  at the time. The US took advantage of this. Resolution S/1588 recommended that member nations making their forces available for Korea do so under the command of the US. (Hillen, 226) The US had already responded militarily, showing that the UN, to being an enforcement organization, is to needed by superpowers such as the US for action. UN Security Council holar D.W. Bowett called the UN resolution an “ex post facto justification”. (Hillen, 227) At its peak, forces in Korea were 550,000 strong, and included 61 air squadrons and over 250 naval vessels. (Hillen 228) A ceasefire I 1953 was negotiated by the 16 nations that were part of the UNC, not by the UN.

The UN-sanctioned Operation Desert Shield mission in the Persian Gulf to maintain the independence of Kuwait and to protect it from Iraqi attack involved over 750,000 troops from more countries than the Korean force. All Security Council  members supported the mission. (Hillen, 228-229) American leadership was informal and was shared with Saudi Arabia.
Conclusion

            Hillen (xxvi) wrote that “Ineffective half-measures taken through the United Nations gave everybody an excuse for inaction and set up a whipping-boy to boot.”

            About cooperation among member nations, Harrison and Nishihara write (63): “…it should always be kept in mind that the success of the United Nations in the field of maintaining international peace and security will, as in other fields, largely depend on the will of its member states. Ultimately, an international organization cannot do more than its members are prepared to take the pains to accomplish, and the United Nations is no exception to this rule.”  They later (113) write: “…no collective effort can overcome the indecision, hesitancy, and weak will of the key member states. Multilateralism has never been able to substitute for national strength and determination – indeed, it must be built on them….”

            Hillen agreed that the UN did not have the legitimacy and authority to handle many of their missions. He writes (31): “This legitimacy and authority stem from the ability of a political organization to mobilize competent military resources, direct them through unambiguous authoritative chains of command, and employ them in timely, rehearsed, and efficient operations.” He writes (34) that the UN was “…a multinational organization that was improvising quasi-military operations because it lacked legitimate, authoritative, and practiced mechanisms for recruiting, forming, and commanding larger and more active military forces.”

            Peacekeeping operations can be hard to monitor, even when a cease-fire is in place. (The Blue Helmets, 6) Economic sanctions must be used with caution since they are often difficult to monitor and inflict hardship on innocent, vulnerable populations, often without changing the actions of political leaders. (The Blue Helmets, 6)

            Harrison and Nishihara write that the US and Europe often used the UN as a Security Council apegoat, blaming it for missions that did not fully succeed, such as the ones in Bosnia and Somalia, when they gave the UN an expansive mandate to solve problems, but without providing the resources, guidance, or political backing to fulfill the job.

             The US and other powers often blame the UN for failures, when they proposed and passed the resolutions setting the military objectives. (Hillen, 182)After UNOSOM II, the US was more careful where to commit troops. In a February 6, 1994 New York Times article, National Adviser Anthony Lake wrote that “peacekeeping is not at the center of our foreign or defense policy”. He wrote that in the future the US would be more selective where to send its troops. The new policy asserted that, before committing troops, the US would need to know: if there is an endpoint to the mission, whether financial and military resources are available, and whether domestic and congressional support can be obtained. The President and Congress would also look to see if the participation would advance US interests, be necessary for mission success and have acceptable command and control arrangements.

The credibility of the UN diminishes with every mission in which its motives are not met. Another issue is respecting the sovereignty of nations while sometimes sending missions with out consent.

Since 2003, at least 2000,000 people have died in western Sudan, according to The Economist. Many nations, including the US, are hesitant to send troops to the region plagued by chaos. Blue Helmets are stationed in southern of the Sudan, but the western region is deemed by some to be too dangerous. Already in southern Sudan millions of people have died. That mission was meant to have 10,000 Blue Helmets, but has less than half of that amount. Memories of Somalia and Rwanda do not allow nations to readily send troops. Peace talks between the Sudan government and rebels have stalled. There is a possibility of a war breaking out between Chad and Sudan. China, which at first objected UN intervention since it buys oil from the Sudan, is lately not objecting. Rebels, mostly the janjaweed, attack and maraud villages, kill and stab victims in bouts of robbery and ethnic cleansing. Even n conditions such as these that have gone on for years, the UN is not quick to respond. This is because of past experiences in places like Somalia, a tight budget, and superpowers such as the US being occupied elsewhere such as Iraq.
Future

Perhaps it would be best for the UN to be more specific in its mandates. One political theorist, Masashiko Asada, wrote that combining PK and PE “will almost inevitably amount to an awkward half-measure” that will “prove fruitless at the end of the day; or worse…may aggravate the situation.”

The UN book The Blue Helmets writes (6) that the UN must “devote sustained effort to promoting respect for fundamental principles of human rights and to developing national institutions capable of ensuring the economic and social welfare of all citizens. This process takes time and resources, but will ultimately help eradicate the root causes of war.”

In an area of the US taking on a mission without seeking UN consent or belligerent consent, what will be the future of peacekeeping and sovereignty? What will be the future for the Blue Helmets? Will withdrawn funds put them in great danger in the future? Will the poor and innocent civilians suffer?

Blue Helmet missions may be fruitless if the nations themselves do not want reconciliation, peace and growth. Especially in nations comprised of disparate ethnic groups, such as many African nations and Iraq, democracy and peace may not be in the foreseeable future. Blue Helmet operations backed by superpowers, with many troops, much financial backing and cl